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This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and write-
offs following CEO turnover. Incoming CEOs often engage in big bath accounting as they dispose 
of poorly performing projects. Overconfident managers overestimate their abilities and 
consequently have upwardly biased expectations concerning future firm performance. I 
hypothesise that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in a big bath following managerial 
change. The empirical results confirm this hypothesis by showing that big baths at CEO turnover 
are significantly less frequent among overconfident CEOs.  
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1. Introduction 
Overconfidence is a particular form of a biased managerial view. Overconfident individuals 
overestimate their abilities and therefore have upwardly biased expectations related to their future 
performance (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008, Ahmed and Duellman 2013). Overconfident 
managers are more optimistic about their ability to turn around poorly performing projects and are 
therefore more likely to overestimate the likelihood and magnitude of projects that go well and 
underestimate the likelihood and magnitude of those that do not perform well. For example, 
Ahmed and Duellman (2013) argue that they may erroneously perceive a project as profitable. In 
line with these arguments, Ahmed and Duellman (2013) show that overconfident managers are 
generally less conservative as they tend to report losses later compared to non-overconfident 
managers.  
A specific form of accounting conservatism is large one-time write-offs, commonly known 
as taking a big bath, highlighting the magnitude of these write-offs. This paper argues that CEOs 
overconfidence determines the likelihood of taking a big bath after being hired, providing a 
potential channel through which the results of Ahmed and Duellman (2013) can arise. Recognition 
of losses is particularly relevant at CEO turnovers as empirical evidence indicates that they are 
more frequent (Johnson et al. 2011) and more extreme in the turnover year (Strong and Meyer 
1987). When new CEOs step into office they often recognise problems ignored by their 
predecessors (Elliott and Shaw 1988), and managerial change induces restructuring (Strong and 
Meyer 1987). Consequently, managers engage in write-offs.  
Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability relative to other managers and are more 
optimistic about the company's projects when these projects are managed by them. Thus, if CEOs 
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report in accordance with their overconfident beliefs, this will result in a lower likelihood of 
engaging in a big bath especially at CEO turnover. When overconfident managers fail to report 
these write-downs in the year of the turnover and postpone them to future periods, they do not 
‘clear the air’ but ‘muddy the waters’ and degrade the firm’s information environment (Haggard 
et al. 2015).  
In the empirical analyses, I employ several measures of CEO overconfidence used in prior 
literature based on the CEOs stock option portfolios (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008), on their 
investment behaviour or on the magnitude of their capital expenditure in comparison to their 
industry peers. Following Elliott and Shaw (1988) and in line with recent literature (e.g. Haggard 
et al. 2015), I use the magnitude of write-offs in the form of special items to measure big baths. 
 The results support the empirical prediction. I find that overconfident CEOs are about 6.3 
to 10.6 percent less likely to engage in a big bath in the turnover year than non-overconfident 
CEOs. Furthermore, I find that this difference is only prevalent in the year of the turnover but 
generally not in the years before or after the turnover.1  
An alternative explanation for the finding could be that there is self-selection of non-
overconfident managers into firms with higher potential for large write-offs in the turnover year. I 
address potential endogeneity and omitted correlated variables concerns in several ways. First, I 
show that the observed big bath choices are not driven by whether CEO turnover is forced. Big 
baths are especially prevalent in forced turnovers (Pourciau 1993, Wells 2002). Second, I use 
entropy balancing so that the first and second moments of all covariates in the year of the turnover 
are the same between overconfident and non-overconfident managers. This mitigates concerns that 
 
1 One measure of overconfidence also shows differences in the fourth year after the turnover. The results can be 
found in Panel C of Table 3. 
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firm characteristics simultaneously explain the choice to hire a CEO of a certain behavioural type 
and determine the predicted big bath pattern. Third, by controlling in big bath regressions for the 
behavioural type of the outgoing CEO, I alleviate the concern that non-overconfident CEOs are 
selected to clean up bloated asset values left behind by overconfident CEOs. Fourth, I include firm 
fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics. The results remain qualitatively 
similar in all specifications.  
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that differences in accounting 
conservatism in the form of write-offs across overconfident and non-overconfident managers only 
arise in the year of CEO turnover and not in subsequent years. This is in contrast to Ahmed and 
Duellman’s findings (2013) that suggest that overconfident managers are generally less 
conservative in their accounting policies. Their market and accruals-based measures of 
conservatism do not explicitly identify one-time write-offs or any other channels through which 
accounting conservatism can be practiced. I add to their paper by showing that big baths at CEO 
turnovers are a potential channel for their findings. Investors should be aware that when 
overconfident managers fail to report these write-downs, earnings are overstated and the financial 
reporting does not accurately reflect the underlying economics of the firm, thereby degrading the 
firm’s information environment. Furthermore, my results suggest that investors should especially 
focus on CEOs (non)overconfidence at CEO turnover; in all other periods, this CEO characteristic 
is of less importance.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical 
hypothesis and section 3 introduces the research methodology. In section 4, I interpret the results 
and section 5 mitigates endogeneity concerns. Section 6 presents robustness tests and section 7 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Recent literature has documented several links between overconfidence and more aggressive 
accounting policies. For example, Schrand and Zechman (2012) report that overconfidence is 
related to financial misreporting and fraud, whereas Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find a negative 
relation between managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism. Hribar and Yang 
(2016), Libby and Rennekamp (2012) and Hilary and Hsu (2011) indicate that overconfident 
managers are more likely to engage in more specific and optimistic management forecasts, and 
Davis et al. (2014) show that they use more positive language in conference calls. Hsieh et al. 
(2014) find that they are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management even 
after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Wong and Zhang (2014) show that CEO 
optimism is a source of analyst forecast bias.  
These results are not surprising as overconfident managers systematically overestimate 
their abilities and consequently the future cash flows they are able to generate. In line with the 
literature on CEO overconfidence and accounting outcomes (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman 2013), I 
argue that overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability relative to other managers. Consequently, 
they are more optimistic about the company's projects and they are more likely to overestimate the 
likelihood and magnitude of projects that go well and underestimate the likelihood and magnitude 
of projects that do not go well. This overestimation has important implications for managers’ 
accounting decisions as they will tend to delay loss recognition (Ahmed and Duellman 2013). 
When CEOs report in accordance with their overconfident beliefs, this will result in a lower 
likelihood of engaging in a big bath. When new CEOs take the reins, they recognise problems 
ignored by their predecessors (Elliott and Shaw 1988), and managerial change induces 
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restructuring (Strong and Meyer 1987). I expect that overconfident managers are less likely to 
show this pattern at CEO turnover.  
HYPOTHESIS: Incoming overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big baths compared to 
incoming non-overconfident CEOs in the turnover year.  
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Measurement of Overconfidence 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), I construct the overconfidence measures based on 
executive option holdings. CEOs are classified as overconfident if they hold an option until 
maturity which is at least 40 percent2 in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity (OC40). Thus, 
overconfidence is considered as an inherent, time-invariant personal characteristic of CEOs. The 
rationale for relying on the option exercise behaviour to classify overconfident and non-
overconfident managers is the following: CEOs face a trade-off between exercising their options 
and retaining them for later use. By retaining their options, they maintain the right to purchase 
company stock at potentially more favourable conditions in the future. The downside of this 
strategy is that it involves substantial costs for the CEO in terms of exposure to idiosyncratic risk. 
Executive stock options typically have a maturity of ten years and become vested after two to four 
years. Furthermore, CEOs are legally prohibited from short-selling their company's stock in the 
US. Given the large proportion of personal wealth tied to their company, diversification abilities 
across alternative investments are also limited. Besides financial exposure, substantial human 
capital is also tied to the company (Malmendier and Tate 2008). Consequently, CEOs can be 
 
2 I additionally use other thresholds and classify CEOs as overconfident if they hold an option until maturity which 
is at least 20, 60, 80 and 100 percent in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity. The results remain qualitatively 
the same. 
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considered as under-diversified investors who have large exposure to their company's risk. Thus, 
a non-overconfident CEO should divest as soon as the option is sufficiently in-the-money because 
the cost of delayed exercise typically exceeds its option value. In contrast, an overconfident CEO 
will not likely exercise stock options in this situation. 
Considering CEO overconfidence as a fixed effect allows me to exploit within-firm 
variation in a CEO turnover setting. However, I acknowledge that there might also be a time-
varying part of an individual’s overconfidence that impacts his/her decisions. Therefore, I run the 
tests with additional measures also to ensure that the respective managers’ level of overconfidence 
is measured at the time of CEO change. 
Similar to Schrand and Zechman (2012), I use a measure of overconfidence based on the 
dollar value of exercisable options. Managers are identified as overconfident if the dollar value of 
their exercisable options (measured as the difference between the current stock price and the 
average exercise price of the options times the number of options held) exceeds the industry 
median based on three-digit SIC codes in the respective year (SZ).  
To further alleviate potential concerns associated with using option-based measures, I also 
employ two investment-based measures of overconfidence. For example, Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) show that overconfidence relates to firms’ investment decisions. In line with Ahmed and 
Duellman (2013), OVERINV is coded one if the residual of industry-year regressions of total asset 
growth on sales growth is positive. Similarly, I classify CEOs as overconfident when capital 
expenditures deflated by lagged total assets exceed the industry-year median (CAPEX).  
3.2 Measurement of Big Baths  
Following Elliott and Shaw (1988), I classify all firm-years with special items (SPI, Compustat 
item #17) less than minus one percent of total assets as big bath years. Special items include any 
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non-recurring items, impairment of goodwill, non-recurring inventory write-downs, bad debt 
expenses, restructuring costs, and provisions for doubtful accounts.3 Special items could occur 
predominantly in a specific year due to economic downturns or other exogenous shocks (e.g. 
natural disasters). This should not have an impact in this setting as CEO changes are distributed 
over a period of 19 years for both groups (overconfident vs. non-overconfident) and both groups 
are approximately equally distributed over time. 
3.3 Control Variables 
Besides the main variable of interest, I control for the following variables which could influence 
big bath behaviour.  
Routine vs. Non-Routine CEO Turnover: Pourciau (1993) and Wells (2002) show that big 
baths are especially pronounced after non-routine turnovers when negative outcomes can easily be 
attributed to the CEO who has left the firm in discord. I hand-collect data on routine and non-
routine turnovers following Hazarika et al. (2012). A CEO turnover is classified as non-routine 
(NONROUTINE) ‘if (i) the CEO was fired, forced out from the position, or departed due to policy 
differences; or (ii) the departing CEO's age is less than 60, and the announcement does not report 
that the CEO died, left because of poor health, or accepted another position elsewhere or within 
the firm; or (iii) the CEO 'retires' but leaves the job within six months of the 'retirement 
announcement'.’ 
Former CEO Type: If former CEOs were overconfident, they might have pursued less 
conservative accounting and depreciated less than necessary. Consequently, assets might be 
 
3 In my sample about 75% of special items consist of asset write-downs, goodwill impairment and restructuring costs.  
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overvalued and big baths would be a justified correction of inflated asset values. Therefore, I 
control for the former CEO type. 
Past Special Items: Elliott and Hanna (1996) show that firms repeatedly write-down assets, 
indicating that past asset write-downs are correlated with future ones. Therefore, I include a control 
variable (PRIORSPI) for the average special items of the last three years.  
Conservatism: Ahmed and Duellman (2013) show that overconfident managers use less 
conservative accounting which could lead to fewer big baths. I control for the level of accounting 
conservatism prior to CEO turnover by including the average accruals over the three previous years 
(PRIORACC). The measure is multiplied by minus one so that larger values denote greater 
accounting conservatism.  
Firm Performance: Prior research suggests that weak firm performance is related to more 
aggressive earnings management. If current firm performance is poor, earnings are shifted from 
the future to the current period (e.g., DeFond and Park 1997, Keating and Zimmerman 1999). 
Furthermore, performance could be mechanically linked to the magnitude of special items since 
poor performance might trigger extraordinary write-offs. To control for firm performance, I 
include return on assets (ROA), which is income before extraordinary items and before special 
items divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Firm Size: The size of the firm could also affect the earnings management behaviour of 
managers. Skinner (1993), for example, shows that firm size increases the likelihood of income-
decreasing depreciation procedures. Further, big baths might be related to firm size as more visible 
firms behave differently with respect to earnings manipulation. SIZE is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars.  
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Debt: The leverage ratio of a firm is related to debt covenant violations. Various papers 
show that earnings are manipulated before and after debt covenant violations (e.g. Press and 
Weintrop 1990, DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994). Covenant violations are most often 
triggered by exceeding preset debt levels. Thus, I control for leverage in all regressions and define 
LEV as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Corporate Governance: Weak internal control systems are often correlated with poor 
earnings quality (Doyle et al. 2007). I include the Entrenchment Index (GOVINDEX) proposed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) to account for the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
management and the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (GINDEX) as a robustness check 
(not tabulated). 
Managerial Compensation: Earnings-based compensation of CEOs provides several 
incentives to manipulate earnings. Holthausen et al. (1995) show that managers engage in income-
decreasing earnings management when bonus schemes are at their maximum. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) point out that earnings manipulation is especially prevalent if compensation is 
closely tied to firm value. I collect information on CEO compensation (bonus and salary) from 
ExecuComp. BONUS is defined as the annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and 
salary. 
Growth Opportunities: Missing earnings benchmarks such as analyst forecasts can be 
particularly severe for high-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan 2002), which may incentivise them 
to manipulate earnings. To control for growth opportunities, I include the market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) and future growth in the regressions. MTB is equal to the market value of a company's 
assets (fiscal year closing price times common shares outstanding plus preferred stock plus total 
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liabilities divided by the book value of a company's assets). GROWTH is an ex-post measure of 
growth opportunities and is defined as the relative increase in market value in the next three years.  
3.4 Big Bath Model 
I use a logit model to test the paper’s hypothesis, using BIGBATH as the dependent variable. 
BIGBATH is a dummy variable that is equal to one if special items are less than minus one percent 
of total assets. OC is the respective overconfident measure and is equal to one if the CEO is 
classified as overconfident and zero if classified as non-overconfident. OC40 is the overconfidence 
classification based on 40 percent in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity. SZ classifies 
managers as overconfident if the moneyness of their exercisable options exceeds the industry 
median based on three-digit SIC codes. OVERINV is coded one if the residual of an industry-year 
regression of total asset growth on sales growth is positive, and zero otherwise. CAPEX is coded 
one if the capital expenditures exceed the industry-year median, and zero otherwise.  
I include ten years surrounding the CEO turnover to investigate whether the different big 
bath behaviour between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs occurs only in the turnover 
year or also before or in the subsequent years. I use indicators for each year that the new CEO is 
in office. Thus, I include six indicator variables, for the year of the turnover and the five years after 
the turnover (e.g., YEAR0 is the year of the turnover and YEAR1 is the year thereafter). Next, I 
interact each year with the respective overconfidence measure (e.g., YEAR0*OC, YEAR1*OC, 
etc.). I expect a negative coefficient of the interaction of the turnover year with the overconfidence 
indicator (YEAR0*OC). 
logit(p)=ln(p / (1 - p)) = 𝛽0 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
6
𝑗=1
∑𝜆𝑗 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐶 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
6
𝑗=1
 
 
where p is the probability of engaging in big bath accounting.   
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4. Sample and Results 
I collect information about CEO compensation and CEO turnover from ExecuComp and merge 
the data with Compustat financials. I limit the sample to those CEOs who have the chance to reveal 
themselves as overconfident or not. CEOs who are only active for a few years cannot be classified 
as overconfident because there is no information in ExecuComp as to whether they hold an option 
package until maturity. I delete financial institutions from the sample because of their special asset 
and impairment structure and limit the sample to CEOs who stayed in office for at least one full 
year after CEO turnover. Thereby, I ensure that the CEO can benefit from a potential big bath.  
I consider 1,175 CEO changes between 1993 and 2012 and the sample consists of 11,642 
firm-year observations surrounding the turnover year [-5,+5] to investigate whether big baths occur 
more frequently and more severe during CEO turnover.4 I include five years before and after CEO 
change. I limit the years after CEO change to firm years when the new CEO was still in office. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of my sample. The incoming CEO is classified 
as overconfident in approximately 25.7 to 56.5 percent of the firms (depending on the measure). 
On average 1.3 percent of total assets are written off in the form of special items (SPI) and 27.8 
percent of all firms have more than one percent special items (BIGBATH). The average return on 
assets (ROA) is 7.0 percent, and the average leverage ratio (LEV) is 19.7 percent. The ratio of cash 
bonus to total cash salary (BONUS) has a mean of 30.8 percent. The average market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) is approximately two. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the mean values for non-big bath firms and big bath firms. I find 
that big bath firms, on average, write-off 5.1 percent of total assets. Furthermore, in line with my 
predictions, big bath firms have fewer overconfident CEOs, independent of which measure is used. 
 
4 The 1,175 CEO changes took place in 1,150 different firms. 
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Panel C of Table 1 shows the fraction of big baths around the CEO turnover, separately for 
overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. The Panel shows that big baths are also present before 
and after the turnover year. However, the fraction of big baths, relative to years before and after 
turnover, increases in the year of the turnover for non-overconfident (37%) but not for 
overconfident CEOs (25%). The difference in the turnover year is statistically significant based on 
a two-sided t-test. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are shown in Table 2. BIGBATH is negatively correlated 
(p<0.01) with all measures for overconfidence (OC40, SZ, OVERINV and CAPEX). The measures 
of overconfidence are positively correlated with each other and in most cases this correlation is 
also statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the overconfidence measures are 
positively correlated with ROA, BONUS, and MTB. BIGBATH is negatively correlated with ROA, 
SIZE, and BONUS.  
Insert Table 2 around here 
To test the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big baths compared 
with non-overconfident CEOs, I estimate logit regressions with BIGBATH as the dependent 
variable. In the regressions I control for the variables PRIORSPI, PRIORACC, ROA, SIZE, LEV, 
GOVINDEX, BONUS, MTB, and GROWTH. The models include industry and time fixed effects 
when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. The marginal effects in 
Table 3 represent the change in the probability of engaging in a big bath for a one-unit change in 
the respective independent variable evaluated at the mean of all other independent variables. In 
Panel A, I only include a dummy variable for the turnover year (YEAR0) and interact it with the 
respective measure of overconfidence (YEAR0*OC). Thus, I compare the turnover year to all years 
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before and after CEO turnover. Across all measures, I find that non-overconfident managers are 
more likely to engage in a big bath at CEO turnover, but that overconfident managers do not show 
this pattern. On average, an overconfident CEO is about 4.3 to 12.0 percent less likely to engage 
in big bath accounting. Thus, I find support for the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs engage in 
big baths less frequently than non-overconfident CEOs.  
In Panel B, I include separate indicators for each year after CEO turnover and the respective 
interactions to investigate if the two types of managers show differences in the likelihood of taking 
a big bath in all years or whether these differences are especially visible in the year of the turnover. 
In all specifications, non-overconfident managers are more likely to engage in earnings baths in 
the year of the turnover, and overconfidence of the new CEO is negatively related to a big bath in 
the year of the turnover. No consistent pattern can be observed in other years.5 Panel C of Table 3 
includes control variables. The effects of the control variables are in line with the findings of prior 
literature on big baths. In particular, big baths are more likely to occur after non-routine turnovers. 
After a CEO has been fired or forced out, the new CEO will engage more often in large write-offs 
that can be attributed to his predecessor. Furthermore, past special items are negatively associated 
with BIGBATH.  
Insert Table 3 around here 
5. Addressing Endogeneity 
Firm characteristics may influence the firm's decision to hire an overconfident CEO and 
simultaneously explain the predicted big bath pattern. I control for potential endogeneity in various 
 
5 In model 3, the coefficient of YEAR4*OC is of similar statistically significance and of similar magnitude as 
YEAR0*OC.  
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ways. First, I control for non-routine turnover events because big baths are especially prevalent in 
non-routine turnovers (Pourciau 1993, Wells 2002). Second, I include firm fixed effects in the 
linear probability model of Panel A of Table 4 to control for time-invariant unobservable firm-
specific characteristics. I still find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in a big bath, 
although the magnitude of the effect is smaller compared to Table 3. Overconfident CEOs are 
between 5.3 and 7.7 percent less likely to take a big bath. Third, I include random effects in the 
regression in Panel B of Table 4 and the magnitude of the coefficient is between 3.4 percent and 
9.3 percent. 
Insert Table 4 around here 
Fourth, I entropy balance the sample to adjust for inequalities in the covariates’ 
distributions of first and second moments between firms that hire an overconfident manager and 
those that hire a non-overconfident manager (Hainmueller 2012). Since prior tables show that 
differences between the two types of managers are only prominent in the turnover year, I only use 
the turnover year in these specifications. Specifically, I reweigh control group observations in such 
a way that they have the same mean and variance as the covariates in the treatment group. Panel 
A of Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the treatment and control groups before and after 
balancing. Although the means and variance are all statistically different between the two groups 
prior to balancing, I do not observe differences in the reweighted sample. Panel B shows that using 
the weights from the entropy balancing does not change the interpretation of my results. In Panel 
C, I additionally match the entropy balanced sample by year so that CEO turnover is equally 
distributed over time for the two types of managers.6 This rules out that the findings are driven by 
 
6 The matching procedure matches one treated observation (overconfident) with one un-treated observation (non-
overconfident) by year. This matching procedure results in more successful matches when observations classified as 
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any changes over time, e.g. inflation or economic trends. The sample size in this test is reduced 
due to the matching algorithm. The results are in line with my predictions.  
Insert Table 5 around here 
Fifth, I take a closer look at the decision made by the previous CEO. So far, the empirical 
results include the variable PRIORSPI to control for write-offs in the previous period. In Table 6, 
I additionally include separate indicators for the four years prior to the turnover event. Thus, I 
compare all years relative to year minus 5, the first year of the sample. Table 6 splits the sample 
into firms where the incoming CEO is overconfident (OC=1) and non-overconfident (OC=0). In 
line with the previous tables, I find that non-overconfident managers engage in a big bath in the 
year of the turnover and overconfident managers do not.7 The difference in the likelihood is 
statistically significant. Interestingly, I also find a higher likelihood of a big bath in the year prior 
to the CEO change (YEAR-1) independent of CEO type. This could be driven by poor performance 
prior to CEO change. Most importantly, there is no statistical difference in big bath behaviour 
between the two samples. This further alleviates self-selection concerns.  
Insert Table 6 around here 
 
overconfident and non-overconfident are equally distributed over time. Since the distribution of managers classified 
as overconfident and non-overconfident over time varies across overconfidence measures, the number of 
observations also varies in Panel C of Table 5.  
 
7 Unreported analyses show similar results for the other overconfidence measures with the exception of the 
statistically significant differences in Year 2. In line with Table 3, there is a significant difference between 
overconfident and non-overconfident in Year 2 when using the OC40 measure, but not when using the other 
measures of overconfidence. 
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6. Robustness Tests and Further Results 
6.1 Alternative Big Bath Thresholds 
This section tests the robustness of my results with respect to the thresholds for big baths. First, I 
define big baths as dummy variable that is equal to one if special items are negative. Next, 
BIGBATH is a dummy variable that is equal to one if special items are less than minus 0.5 percent 
of total assets, less than minus one percent of total assets, less than minus 1.5 percent of total 
assets, or less than minus two percent of total assets. The results suggest that the findings are not 
sensitive to the measurement of big baths. Firms hiring an overconfident rather than a non-
overconfident CEO are less likely to engage in a big bath. The effect is statistically significant 
across all specifications. I only report the results using the OC40 classification. However, using 
the alternative overconfidence classifications leads to similar results. 
Insert Table 7 around here 
6.2 Quarterly Data 
One potential concern with the analysis is the use of annual data. With annual data, I cannot be 
sure that write-offs can be attributed to the new CEO. For example, the new CEO may have been 
hired in the fourth fiscal quarter of the year, and write-offs may have taken place in the first three 
quarters and therefore be attributable to the old CEO. To further ensure that the results are not 
driven by write-offs of the outgoing CEO, I additionally investigate quarterly data on special items. 
The results of Table 8 are similar in economic magnitude to the previous analyses: Incoming 
overconfident CEOs are about 8.3 to 9.2 percent less likely to engage in a big bath in the last fiscal 
quarter of the turnover year (BIGBATHt,4Q). The sample size of Table 8 is reduced as quarterly 
special items are not available for the entire time frame.  
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Insert Table 8 around here 
6.3 Discontinued Operations 
An alternative way of taking a big bath is disposing of a major line of business. The effect of the 
disposal is reflected in discontinued operations (Compustat Item #66). Compared to special items, 
discontinued operations are less frequent and lower in magnitude. In my sample, the mean of 
discontinued operations is 0.08 percent of total assets. In line with the previous analyses, I define 
a big bath if discontinued operations are below minus one percent of total assets. Table 9 repeats 
the analyses of Table 3 with BIGBATHt,DC as the dependent variable. I find that overconfident 
managers are less likely to have discontinued operations at the time of CEO turnover across all 
models. However, the results are only statistically significant in two specifications.  
Insert Table 9 around here 
6.4 Size of Big Baths 
The findings show that overconfident managers are less likely to engage in a big bath in the 
turnover year. In untabulated results, I limit the sample to firms with negative special items. Thus, 
I test whether managers take a smaller write-down conditional on taking the write-down. I do not 
find statistically significant differences between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. I 
conclude that overconfidence influences the likelihood of a big bath, but that the size of the big 
bath is unrelated to overconfidence.  
6.5 Internal vs. External CEO 
The incoming CEO can either be hired externally or recruited from inside the firm. This could 
affect the probability of engaging in a big bath and also be correlated with routine turnovers or 
overconfidence. For a subset of observations, I examine the time when the CEO joined the 
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company to determine whether the CEO was an internal promotion or an external hire. I classify 
CEOs as insiders if they joined the respective firm at least two years prior to the engagement as 
CEO. I find that approximately 23 percent of the CEOs are external hires, which is positively 
correlated with a non-routine turnover (Coef. 0.116, P-Value: <0.01). In other words, when a CEO 
is fired, it is more likely that an external CEO is hired. However, the decision to hire an internal or 
external CEO is not correlated with the level of overconfidence of the CEO. In non-tabulated 
results, I continue to find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big bath accounting 
when I control for internal promotions or external hires. 
6.6 Corporate Governance 
I additionally investigate the effect of corporate governance on the relation between 
overconfidence and the likelihood of engaging in a big bath. Good corporate governance 
mechanisms and external monitoring can help to align the write-off behaviour of overconfident 
CEOs with the underlying economics of the firm. Unreported results show no differences when I 
partition the sample based on low vs. high level the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. 
Alternatively, I split the sample based on the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (GINDEX). 
Again, the results are inconclusive. However, both measures are proxies for the level of 
shareholder rights and thus might not be able to capture governance structures that directly affect 
financial reporting. These findings are consistent with the results of Ahmed and Duellman (2013) 
and Schrand and Zechman (2011). Ahmed and Duelman (2013) do not find consistent evidence 
that external monitoring moderates the relation between overconfidence and accounting 
conservatism. Similarly, Schrand and Zechman (2012) do not report systematic differences in 
governance structures between firms that misreport earnings and those that do not. In line with the 
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arguments above, they note that ’the notion of good governance is difficult to identify and 
measure’.  
7. Conclusion 
Prior literature shows that CEOs use large write-offs in the year of the turnover (Murphy and 
Zimmerman 1993) and that non-routine CEO changes explain cross-sectional variation in big baths 
at CEO turnover. I investigate whether overconfident managers are less likely to engage in an 
earnings big bath after their appointment. In my empirical analyses, I find fewer big baths in firms 
with a new overconfident CEO than in firms with a new non-overconfident CEO. The findings are 
robust to alternative overconfidence classifications, big bath definitions, the endogenous choice of 
hiring an overconfident CEO, and to several alternative explanations of accounting behaviour at 
the turnover event, such as the turnover type (routine vs. non-routine), managerial compensation 
and corporate governance mechanisms. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find that overconfident 
managers are generally less conservative in their accounting policies. I add to their paper by 
showing their results could partly be driven by big baths at CEO turnover.  
The findings of the paper widen our understanding of how managerial traits, in particular 
overconfidence, affect accounting outcomes. My findings are useful for investors assessing the 
financial situation around CEO turnover and for firms hiring a new CEO to understand the 
influence of managerial traits on financial reporting. In particular, investors should be aware that 
earnings are overstated when overconfident managers fail to report write-offs.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Full Sample  
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
BIGBATHt 11,642 0.278 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SPIt 11,642 -0.013 0.038 -0.243 -0.012 -0.001 0.000 0.070 
OC40t 11,642 0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SZt 11,642 0.551 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OVERINVt 11,642 0.297 0.457 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CAPEXt 11,642 0.565 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PRIORSPIt 11,642 -0.001 0.013 -0.702 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 
NONROUTINEt 11,642 0.009 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PRIORACCt 11,642 0.010 0.032 -0.178 -0.006 0.005 0.021 0.202 
ROAt 11,642 0.070 0.081 -0.234 0.032 0.062 0.106 0.375 
SIZEt 11,642 7.517 1.655 3.680 6.330 7.451 8.637 11.601 
LEVt 11,642 0.197 0.155 0.000 0.062 0.188 0.298 0.695 
GOVINDEXt 11,642 2.791 1.144 0.000 2.000 2.778 3.000 6.000 
BONUSt 11,642 0.308 0.119 0.000 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.702 
MTBt-1 11,642 1.970 1.293 0.737 1.198 1.540 2.209 8.390 
GROWTHt 11,642 1.411 1.083 0.147 0.872 1.119 1.591 7.475 
 
Panel B. Comparison of Non-Big Bath Firms (BIGBATHt=0) with Big Bath Firms (BIGBATHt=1) 
 BIGBATHt=0  BIGBATHt=1    
Variable N Mean  N Mean    
SPIt 8,407 0.001  3,235 -0.051***    
OC40t 8,407 0.270  3,235 0.222***    
SZt 8,407 0.568  3,235 0.509***    
OVERINVt 8,407 0.313  3,235 0.254***    
CAPEXt 8,407 0.573  3,235 0.544***    
PRIORSPIt 8,407 -0.001  3,235 0.065***    
NONROUTINEt 8,407 0.006  3,235 -0.003***    
PRIORACCt 8,407 0.010  3,235 0.016    
ROAt 8,407 0.074  3,235 0.009***    
SIZEt 8,407 7.540  3,235 0.062**    
LEVt 8,407 0.194  3,235 7.457***    
GOVINDEXt 8,407 2.788  3,235 0.207    
BONUSt 8,407 0.310  3,235 2.798***    
MTBt-1 8,407 1.984  3,235 0.301***    
GROWTHt 8,407 1.386  3,235 1.936***    
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Panel C. Big Baths Around the Turnover Year 
Year (1) OC40=0 (2) OC40=1 Delta (1) – (2)       
YEAR-5 0.224 0.206 0.019      
YEAR-4 0.260 0.181 0.079**      
YEAR-3 0.293 0.248 0.045      
YEAR-2 0.251 0.189 0.062*      
YEAR-1 0.308 0.278 0.030      
YEAR0 0.368 0.252 0.116***      
YEAR1 0.317 0.297 0.020      
YEAR2  0.293 0.211 0.082**      
YEAR 3 0.294 0.283 0.010      
YEAR 4 0.292 0.254 0.037      
YEAR 5 0.306 0.258 0.048      
This table provides descriptive statistics in Panel A. Panel B compares the mean values for firms with BIGBATH=0 
and BIGBATH=1. Panel C shows the percentage of firm-years that engage in big bath accounting separately for 
firms that hire a manager classified as non-overconfident manager (OC40=0) and overconfident (OC40=1). 
BIGBATH is a dummy variable which equals one if special items divided by total assets are less than minus one 
percent. SPI is special items divided by total assets. OC40 is the overconfidence classification based on 40 percent 
in-the-moneyness at the year-end prior to maturity. SZ classifies managers as overconfident if the moneyness of 
their exercisable options exceeds the industry median based on three-digit SIC codes. OVERINV is coded one if 
the residual of an industry-year regression of total asset growth on sales growth is positive, and zero otherwise. 
CAPEX is coded one if capital expenditures exceed the industry-year median, and zero otherwise. PRIORSPI is 
the average special items of the last three years prior to CEO turnover. NONROUTINE is coded one if the 
management change is non-routine following Hazarika et al. (2012). PRIORACC is the average accruals over the 
last three years prior to CEO turnover. ROA is return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items and 
special items divided by total assets. SIZE is total assets in log $million. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. 
GOVINDEX is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. BONUS is a manager’s annual bonus payment 
divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total 
assets. GROWTH is the relative increase in market value in the next three years. ***,**,* indicate significance 
between the means of Panel B and Panel C based on two-sided t-tests at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) BIGBATHt  -0.79* -0.05* -0.05* -0.06* -0.03* -0.04* 0.05* 0.02 -0.05* -0.02 0.03* -0.01 -0.03* -0.03* 
(2) OC40t -0.62*  0.07* 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.07* -0.04* -0.02 0.03* -0.02 -0.04* -0.03* 0.04* 0.05* 
(3) SZt -0.05* 0.04*  0.11* 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05* 0.09* -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 0.04* 0.08* 
(4) OVERINVt -0.05* 0.05* 0.11*  0.03* 0.09* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.17* 0.21* 0.03* 0.07* 0.02* 0.12* 
(5) CAPEXt -0.06* 0.05* 0.02 0.03*  0.16* 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.08* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08* 
(6) PRIORSPIt -0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.09* 0.16*  -0.00 -0.02 -0.06* 0.15* -0.01 -0.02* 0.03* 0.00 0.15* 
(7) NONROUTINEt -0.07* 0.07* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02  -0.19* -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
(8) PRIORACCt 0.05* -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.16*  0.00 -0.02* -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
(9) ROAt 0.01 0.01 -0.07* 0.00 -0.02 -0.03* 0.00 0.01  -0.15* 0.15* 0.05* -0.01 0.01 -0.05* 
(10) SIZEt -0.06* 0.05* 0.08* 0.15* 0.07* 0.14* 0.05* -0.03* -0.15*  -0.09* -0.31* -0.03* 0.08* 0.67* 
(11) LEVt -0.02 0.06* -0.03* 0.21* 0.00 -0.02 0.03* -0.01 0.17* -0.05*  0.32* 0.10* 0.04* -0.15* 
(12)GOVINDEXt 0.04* -0.02 -0.02 0.03* -0.01 -0.02* 0.02 0.00 0.05* -0.22* 0.27*  0.10* 0.00 -0.34* 
(13) BONUSt 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05* 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.0057 0.01 -0.05* 0.05* 0.08*  -0.05* -0.10* 
(14) MTBt-1 -0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.001 0.01 0.08* 0.05* -0.01 -0.07*  0.08* 
(15) GROWTHt -0.02 0.00 0.05* 0.08* 0.07* 0.12* -0.03* -0.01 -0.05* 0.54* -0.20* -0.27* -0.14* 0.07*  
This table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. Variables are defined in Table 1. * indicates significance 
at the 1 percent level. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2244870
 27 
Table 3: Big Bath Regressions 
Panel A: Big Bath Regressions – Turnover Year  
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
YEAR0*OCt -0.110*** -0.120*** -0.069** -0.043** 
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.031) 0.021) 
YEAR0 0.089*** 0.128*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) 
Year-FE No No No No 
Industry-FE No No No No 
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642 
Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
Panel B: Big Bath Regressions – Years after Turnover 
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
YEAR0*OCt -0.104*** -0.118*** -0.091** -0.042* 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.036) (0.022) 
YEAR1*OCt -0.012 -0.033 -0.043* -0.037* 
  (0.025) (0.038) (0.023) (0.021) 
YEAR2*OCt -0.084*** -0.045* -0.035 -0.002 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) 
YEAR3*OCt -0.010 -0.036 -0.050 -0.023 
  (0.032) (0.023) (0.043) (0.027) 
YEAR4*OCt -0.036 -0.004 -0.101** 0.015 
  (0.037) (0.025) (0.043) (0.038) 
YEAR5*OCt -0.035 -0.009 -0.043* 0.009 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.023) (0.034) 
YEAR0 0.082*** 0.119*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) 
YEAR1 0.028** 0.041 0.034*** 0.044*** 
  (0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014) 
YEAR2 0.005 0.008 -0.008 -0.015 
  (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) 
YEAR3 0.004 0.018 0.012 0.012 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
YEAR4 0.000 -0.011 0.013 -0.021 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) 
YEAR5 0.016 0.008 0.014 -0.001 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642 
Pseudo R-squared 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.053 
 
Panel C: Big Bath Regressions – Controls and Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
YEAR0*OCt -0.091*** -0.106*** -0.065* -0.063* 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.039) (0.036) 
YEAR1*OCt -0.005 -0.025 -0.038 -0.029 
  (0.026) (0.041) (0.024) (0.024) 
YEAR2*OCt -0.054 -0.041 -0.037 0.003 
  (0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.022) 
YEAR3*OCt -0.005 -0.029 -0.053 -0.016 
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  (0.033) (0.023) (0.046) (0.028) 
YEAR4*OCt -0.032 0.004 -0.106** 0.023 
  (0.038) (0.026) (0.045) (0.039) 
YEAR5*OCt -0.032 -0.006 -0.024 0.017 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.037) 
YEAR0 0.043 0.069** 0.050** 0.012 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024) 
NONROUTINEt 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.121** 0.126*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) 
YEAR1 0.022* 0.033 0.030** 0.036** 
  (0.011) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014) 
YEAR2 0.006 0.006 -0.007 -0.018 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) 
YEAR3 0.004 0.016 0.015 0.010 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
YEAR4 0.002 -0.012 0.018 -0.022 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
YEAR5 0.021 0.012 0.020 0.000 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) 
OCt-1 -0.007 0.002 -0.056*** 0.065** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.032) 
PRIORSPIt -1.952*** -1.987*** -1.900*** -2.034*** 
  (0.422) (0.402) (0.418) (0.459) 
PRIORACCt 0.119 0.126 0.114 0.140 
  (0.187) (0.185) (0.190) (0.190) 
ROAt -0.409*** -0.397*** -0.408*** -0.413*** 
  (0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.112) 
SIZEt 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
LEVt 0.092** 0.094** 0.096** 0.094** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
GOVINDEXt -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
BONUSt -0.072* -0.066* -0.074* -0.076* 
  (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) 
MTBt-1 0.011* 0.012** 0.012* 0.011* 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GROWTHt 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642 
Pseudo R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.062 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions. Variables are defined in Table 1. Panel A only includes a 
dummy variable for the turnover year (YEAR0) and the interaction with the respective measure of overconfidence 
(YEAR0*OC). OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Panel B also includes separate indicators for each 
year after CEO turnover and the interactions with the overconfidence measures. YEARX is an indicator variable coded 
1 in year X year after CEO turnover (e.g. YEAR1 is the first year after CEO turnover). Panel C additionally includes 
control variables. The regressions include industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Firm Fixed Effects and Random Fixed Effects 
Panel A. Linear Probability Model Including Firm Fixed Effects   
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
  OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX  
YEAR0*OCt -0.070** -0.077*** -0.053* -0.060*  
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034)  
YEAR0 0.038 0.064* 0.055*** 0.035  
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.018) (0.022)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642  
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19  
 
Panel B. Random Effects Logistic Regression   
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
YEAR0*OCt -0.075** -0.093*** -0.034* -0.054* 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.017) (0.032) 
YEAR0 0.051* 0.080** 0.062*** 0.038* 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.018) (0.023) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642 
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
This table provides the results of a linear probability model in Panel A and random effects logistic regression in Panel 
B. YEAR0 is the turnover year. OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Big Bath Regressions in Turnover Year - Entropy Balancing 
Panel A: Original Sample    
 TREATMENT  CONTROL ORIGINAL  CONTROL 
BALANCED   Mean Variance  Mean Variance  Mean Variance 
NONROUTINEt 0.068 0.064  0.093 0.085***  0.068 0.064 
OCt-1 0.833 0.139  0.800 0.160  0.833 0.139 
PRIORSPIt -0.011 0.001  -0.015** 0.002***  -0.011 0.001 
PRIORACCt 0.014 0.001  0.008*** 0.001***  0.013 0.001 
ROAt 0.084 0.006  0.060 0.007**  0.083 0.006 
SIZEt 7.498 2.200  7.636 2.775**  7.496 2.200 
LEVt 0.192 0.023  0.199 0.024  0.192 0.023 
GOVINDEXt 2.733 1.291  2.770 1.332  2.732 1.291 
BONUSt 0.340 0.060  0.282*** 0.066  0.340 0.060 
MTBt-1 2.115 1.983  1.948** 1.831***  2.115 1.982 
GROWTHt 1.485 0.847  1.453 1.364***  1.486 0.850 
 
Panel B: Big Bath Regressions – Entropy Balancing 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 BIGBATHt OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
OCt -0.083*** -0.101*** -0.054* -0.077* 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.042) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.15 0.12 0.08 0.18 
N 1,175 1,175 1,174 1,174 
 
Panel C: Big Bath Regressions – Entropy Balancing and Matching on Years 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 BIGBATHt OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
OCt -0.133*** -0.094*** -0.071* -0.073*   
  (0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.043) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.15 0.12 0.09 0.17 
N 582 1,038 659 1,023 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using BIGBATHt as the dependent variable of an entropy 
balanced sample. Panel A shows the summary statistics before and after entropy balancing. Panel B displays the 
entropy balanced regression results. In Panel C, treatment and control firms are additionally matched on year. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2244870
 31 
 
Table 6: Big Bath Regressions - Years Prior to CEO Change 
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 DIFF 
 OC=1 OC=0  
YEAR-4 -0.046** 0.023 -0.069* 
  (0.023) (0.024)  
YEAR-3 0.016 0.051** -0.035 
  (0.027) (0.021)  
YEAR-2 -0.038 -0.001 -0.037 
  (0.030) (0.023)  
YEAR-1 0.045* 0.062*** -0.017 
  (0.024) (0.023)  
YEAR0 -0.037 0.079** -0.116*** 
 (0.039) (0.033)  
YEAR1 0.033 0.047** -0.014 
  (0.037) (0.021)  
YEAR2 -0.042 0.031 -0.073** 
  (0.035) (0.031)  
YEAR3 0.017 0.031 -0.014 
  (0.025) (0.029)  
YEAR4 -0.010 0.028 -0.038 
  (0.031) (0.032)  
YEAR5 0.002 0.052* -0.050 
  (0.041) (0.031)  
Controls Yes Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
N 11,642 11,642  
Pseudo R-squared 0.073 0.066  
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using BIGBATHt as the dependent variable. OC is the 
overconfidence classification based on 40 percent in-the-moneyness at the year-end prior to maturity. Variables are 
defined in Table 1. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year 
and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Big Bath Regressions - Alternative Big Bath Thresholds 
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt (< 0.000) (< 0.005) (< 0.010) (< 0.015) (< 0.020) 
OC40t -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.092** -0.095*** -0.049 
  0.027 0.036 0.039 0.034 0.035 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.102 0.112 0.104 0.099 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using BIGBATHt as the dependent variable. BIGBATH 
is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than the specified threshold 
in each column in the turnover year. Variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include industry and year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Big Bath Regressions - 4th Quarter 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 BIGBATHt,4Q OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
OCt -0.088** -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.086*** 
  0.028 0.025 0.027 0.031 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 842 842 842 842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.094 0.103 0.102 0.095 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
BIGBATH is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than minus 0.25 
percent in the fourth quarter of the turnover year. OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Variables are 
defined in Table 1. The regressions include industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Big Bath Regressions - Discontinued Operations 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 BIGBATHt,DC OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX 
OCt -0.023** -0.018 -0.050** -0.002 
  0.011 0.015 0.021 0.017 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 0.144 0.146 0.140 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
BIGBATHDC is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if discontinued operations divided by total assets are less 
than minus one percent. OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Variables are defined in Table 1. The 
regressions include industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and are 
provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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